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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
January, 195S
CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITTEE REPORT
The Trustees of the Seattle Bar Association have requested its Civil
Rights Committee to make a study of and to report their recommenda-
tions upon the matter of whether the Supreme Court of Washington
should promulgate a rule generally to the effect that there be added as
an additional ground for disbarment, the ground that an attorney has
invoked the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution or Article I,
Section 9 of the State Constitution, dealing with compulsory self-
incrimination.
This matter, with particular reference to Communism and subversive
activities generally, has received considerable attention by reason of
the passage of a resolution of the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association adopted on February 24, 1953, quoted in the foot-
notes,' and more recently by reason of the action of the Washington
State Bar Association at its convention in Spokane in September of
I The resolution adopted by the House of Delegates on February 24, 1953, reads
as follows:
"WHEREAS, it has been thoroughly established that International Communism,
the Communist Party of the United States and individual Communists aim and plan
to overthrow the government of this country and of other countries by force and
violence and that Communist activities in this country are dominated and dictated by
a foreign power; and
"WHEREAS, membership in or adherence to the Communist Party of the United
States by an attorney is inconsistent with and violates his fundamental oath of
office; and
"WHEREAS, evidence has been adduced through sworn testimony in Congres-
sional investigations that some attorneys, relatively few in number, have been members
of Communist Party cells; and
"WHEREAS, some attorneys have, in lawful inquiries into their membership and
activities in the Communist Party, refused to testify on the ground that such testi-
mony would tend to incriminate them; and
"WHEREAS it is the duty of the Bar to cause further inquiry to be made to
determine the fitness of such attorneys to continue to practice;
BE IT RESOLVED,
(a) That the Attorney General be requested to review the roster of such attorneys
and if he believes the facts warrant to move before any Federal Court to which each
of said attorneys may have been admitted, that the Court inquire into his activities and
conduct and determine his fitness to continue to practice in such court, and
(b) That the state bar associations or other local associations having jurisdiction
be requested to make like inquiry and, where warranted, to institute proceedings to
determine his fitness to continue to practice."
[WINTER
CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITTEE REPORT
1954, at which time the matter dealt with in this report was made the
subject of a resolution, the text of which is set out in the footnotes.2
The Civil Rights Committee has made an independent study of the
question and now submits its report and recommendations.
Under the State Bar Act (R.C.W. 2.48), the statutory grounds of
disbarment or suspension are set out in Section 2.48.220, in which the
grounds for disbarment include:
"(1) His conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, in which case the record of conviction shall be conclusive
evidence....
"(3) By violation of his oath as an attorney...
"(6) For the commission of an act involving moral turpitude, dis-
honesty or corruption, whether the same be committed in the course of
his relations as an attorney at law or otherwise, and whether the same
constitutes a felony or misdemeanor or not; and if the act constitutes
a felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a criminal proceeding
shall not be a condition precedent to disbarment or suspension from
the practice thereof."
Under Rule 10 of the Rules of Court for the Discipline of Attorneys
membership in any party or organization whose purpose is to overthrow
the United States Government by force or violence, is ground for dis-
barment. Ever since 1950 the Rules for Admission to Practice pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington have had in
the required "Oath of Attorney" the following statement (Rule 18):
"I am not now, and never have been, a member of any organization
or party having for its purpose and object the overthrow of the United
States Government by force or violence; ...
Although the validity of Rule 10 and Revised Rule 18 has not been
passed upon in this state, the fact that the court by the exercise of
its rule-making power, in effect amends the statuteg dealing with the
2 "BE IT RESOLVED: That the Washington State Bar Association does
hereby go on record in favor of having the Board of Governors give immediate
consideration to the formulation and reconnendation to the Supreme Court of the
adoption of an amendment of the rules for the discipline of attorneys by adding as a
ground for reprimand, suspension or disbarment, a provision embodying substantially
the following:
"Claiming protection under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to avoid
giving testimony before a properly constituted congressional or legislative committee
or before the courts as to possible communistic affiliation or other subversive activities
against our Government."
1955]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
admission to the bar and with disbarment, has not in most courts been
considered beyond the power of the court.'
It will be noted from the foregoing review of the applicable statutes
and rules that ample power exists under the present law for the disbar-
ment of an attorney who is a member of a subversive organization, or
whose conduct, whether or not as a member of a subversive organiza-
tion or violator of any law, is such as to disclose a lack of the integrity
requisite to admission to the bar or to continued membership therein.
It will be noted, however, that under the existing statutes and rules,
the mere invocation of the Fifth Amendment by an attorney, whether
the proceeding be before a court or legislative body, is not in itself
ground for disbarment. It is necessary to go further and show that the
attorney is guilty of misconduct either incident to or independently of
the invocation of the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, which misconduct under the statute and rules of the
Supreme Court is ground for disbarment.
We are therefore led to a consideration of the nature and purpose
of a disbarment proceeding (including suspension or other discipline),
and the nature and purpose of the constitutional provisions against
compulsory self-incrimination.
A disbarment proceeding is a special proceeding, neither criminal
nor civil in character.' The purpose of such a proceeding is not to
punish the individual lawyer, but rather to determine his fitness for
the continued practice of law.5 Consequently, the fact that a lawyer
may have been pardoned or the fact that the statute of limitations may
be a bar to prosecution," or the fact that the attorney has been acquitted
in a criminal proceedings,8 would not prevent disbarment proceedings.
It is to be noted that the investigation is not confined to the investiga-
tion of conduct constituting crimes. Under the statute above quoted,9
"any action involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption,
3 See: 7 C. J. S. 734; People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487,
60 A.L.R. 851 (1928), dealing with the power of a court to inquire into the conduct
of attorneys. See also Committee of Grievances of State Bar Ass'n. v. Strickland, 200
N.C. 630, 158 S.E. 110 (1931), State ex rel. Grievance Committee of Ore. State Bar
Ass'n. v. Woerndle, 109 Ore. 461, 220 Pac. 744 (1923).
4 See note 11, 12 infra.
6 See Notes 12, 21 infra; Grievance Committee of Hartford County Bar Ass'n. v.
Broder, 112 Conn. 269, 152 Atl. 292 (1930). A higher standard of private conduct is
expected from an attorney than from the rank and file of our citizenry. State v. Bieber,
121 Kan. 536, 247 Pac. 875, 48 A.L.R. 252 (1926), State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91
Atl. 274 (1914).
6 See Notes 12, 23 infra.
7See Notes 12, 23 infra.
8 The cases are collected in Annotation, 123 A.L.R. 780.
9 RCW 2.48.220.
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whether the same be committed in the course of his relations as an
attorney at law or otherwise, or whether the same constitutes a felony
or misdemeanor or not" would be ground for disbarment. Of course, a
lawyer may be disciplined for improper conduct even though no crime
is involved."
So careful have courts been to assure themselves of the fitness of an
attorney to continue to practice law that they have held that a disbar-
ment proceeding is not a criminal proceeding 1 and that accordingly
the right that an attorney would otherwise have to refuse to tesify
against himself is not available in a disbarment proceeding. 2 In a
California case' there is ambiguous language suggesting that a de-
fendant attorney in a disbarment proceeding who is compelled to testify
as a witness may nevertheless refuse to answer questions propounded
to him on the ground that his testimony would tend to incriminate him.
However, it has also been held, both in that same case and in others,
that should an attorney fail or refuse to testify on his own behalf with
respect to evidence against him in a disbarment proceeding, adverse
inferences from the fact of such refusal may be drawn against him."
10 In re Bolin, 132 Wash. 453, 232 Pac. 370 (1925), Grievance Committee of Hart-
ford County Bar v. Broder, note 5, supra. Cf. Re Charles Clifton, 33 Ida. 614, 196
Pac. 670, 19 A.L.R. 931 (1921), held, unpatriotic acts not amounting to crime not
grounds for disbarment.
1Se Note 12, infra. In -re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917).
1In re Vaughan, 189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac. 353 (1922), McIntosh v. State Bar of
California, 211 Cal. 261, 294 Pac. 1067, (1930), Johnson v. State Bar of California,
4 Cal. Rep. (2d) 744), 52 P. 2d 928 (1936), Brophy v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion, 46 Cal. App. (2d) 278, 115 P.2d 835 (1941). See also: In re West, 348 Mo. 30,
152 S.W.2d 69 (1941) In re Fenn, 235 Mo. App. 24, 128 S.W.2d 657 (1939). [In re
Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 41, 121 N.E2d 826 (1954), Martin v. Law Society of British
Columbia, 3 D.L.R. 173 (British Columbia, 1950). (These two cases deal with admis-
sion to the bar as distinguished from disbarment proceedings and discuss membership
in Communist or subversive organizations as grounds for refusing admission to the
Bar.) ] For an understandable limitation of this rule in reinstatement proceedings, see
Ex Parte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 147 So. 791 (1933), Note 16, infra.
13In re Vaughan, 189 Cal. 491, 209 Pac. 353, 24 A.L.R. 858 (1922): "In our
opinion, in view of these considerations, this is not such a criminal prosecution against
appellant as would entitle him to decline to testify on the ground that he cannot be
compelled to 'be a witness against himself' (Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 13), but he may be
called and examined for the information of the court, without, of course, infringing his
right to decline to answer questions propounded to him, on the ground that his testimony
would tend to incriminate him." It is not clear whether the court intended to uphold the
attorney's right to refuse to answer specific questions (as distinguished from refusing
to testify as a witness) or whether the court merely meant that because a disbarment
proceeding is not a criminal proceeding there was no right to decline to answer ques-
tions and therefore no infringement of any such right. Although it is likely that the
court intended the latter, it is assumed for purposes of this report that the court is
of the former view. Later California cases do not clear up this ambiguity. See Webster
v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Cal.2d 534, 110 P.2d 992 (1941), West Coast Home
Imp. Co. v. Contractors' St. L. Bd., 72 Cal. App2d 287, 164 P2d 811 (1945) ; see also
In re Barach, 279 Pa. 89, 123 Atl. 727 (1924).
14 See Fish v. State Bar, 214 Cal. 215, 4 P.2d 937, (1931), In re Fenn, 235 Mo.
App. 24, 128 S.W2d 657 (1939). Cf. Annotation, 24 A.L.R2d 895.
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As a practical matter, therefore, the possible privilege against self-
incrimination in a disbarment proceeding, even if it can be said to
exist, furnishes no substantial obstacle to the ascertainment of the facts
concerning the fitness of the attorney to practice law. It has been
suggested that there may be circumstances (in other than disbarment
proceedings) in which the privilege against self-incrimination should
not in all honesty and good conscience be invoked," but no case has
been found so holding. Indeed, in the three principal cases in which
the question has been raised as to whether the invocation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination is in itself ground for disbarment, each
of the courts involved, namely, New York, Illinois and Mississippi, has
held that the mere invocation of the privilege does not violate any legal
or moral rule and therefore is neither ground for disbarment nor
ground for refusing reinstatement.16
We turn to a consideration of the nature and purpose of the constitu-
tional protection against compulsory self-incrimination.
Compulsory self-incrimination is the subject of constitutional pro-
tection both under the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
and Article I, Section 9 of the State Constitution. Similar provisions
will be found in forty-six state constitutions in this country. In the
two states where there is no constitutional provision, compulsory self-
incrimination is protected against in the common law of the states."
Protection against compulsory self-incrimination finds its roots in
the common law of England, which provides protection against such
self-incrimination as a protection against a species of torture compelled
by the use of the oath in ecclesiastical courts and compelled by physical
means in the common law courts, where the practice in time was con-
sidered so odious as to be condemned. When the colonists came to
America from England, they brought with them the common law
principle against compulsory self-incrimination. In time the principle
became embodied in the constitution of the various colonies when,
upon the colonies declaring their independence, they established state
constitutions embodying bills of rights. Protection against compulsory
15 In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543, 548 (1941).
16 In re Ellis, 282 N.Y. 435, 26 N.E2d 967 (1940) involving refusal to sign waiver
of immunity in an investigation of unlawful practices ordered by the court, In re
Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E2d 543 (1941) involving refusal to answer questions
before a Grand Jury, Ex Parte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 147 So. 791 (1933) involving
reinstatement of disbarred attorney who refused to testify in reinstatement proceedings
concerning matters determined by the judgment in the disbarment proceedings.
17 See Note 16 infra. The privilege is aimed at decency in law enforcement. Its
existence aids the innocent as well as the guilty. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908), 8 WIGAoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed.) 308-9.
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self-incrimination was not established by these constitutions. The
constitutions merely recognized rights already existing against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, and erected a constitutional barrier to
legislative or judicial changes in such rights. 8 So highly esteemed was
this right that even in a time of stress it became one of the ten amend-
ments to the Constitution constituting the traditional Bill of Rights.
Since then the Fifth Amendment has been frequently invoked
throughout the country. When federal prosecutions were involved, the
Fifth Amendment was invoked; when state prosecutions were involved,
the corresponding state privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
was invoked. In the course of time it has become settled that the
invocation of the Fifth Amendment protects only against federal
prosecutions and not against state prosecutions.' 9 Consequently, evi-
dence obtained in a federal prosecution or proceeding disclosing the
existence of a state crime, may be the basis for conviction in a state
criminal proceeding thereafter begun. 0 Correspondingly, evidence
obtained in a state proceeding disclosing the existence of a federal
crime, may be the basis for conviction 'in a federal proceeding there-
after begun.2 The fact that a federal crime may be disclosed does not
prevent the giving of testimony in a state proceeding.2
Likewise, it is settled that if, as a result of a pardon or the expiration
of the statute of limitations or the existence of an immunity statute
co-extensive with the privilege, it is no longer possible to prosecute the
witness, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination cannot be
invoked.2
It is also settled that the privilege is personal to the witness, it must
be claimed by the witness himself, and2 cannot be claimed by the
18 See Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. Rm. 763, cited in dissenting opinion, Rogers
v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950). See also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908) ; Constitution of the United States, revised and annotated in 1952, page 841,
being Senate Document No. 170.
29 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). Cf. United States v. DiCarlo,
102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D.O., 1952) (invoking Congressional inquiry into crimes against
state laws); United States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen, 173 F2d 668 (7th Cir., 1949),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 961 (1949).
20 See United States v. Penn, 111 F. Supp. 605 (M.D.N.C., 1953).21 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
22 See: United States v. Penn, note 20, supra, United States v. Forrester, 105 F.
Supp. 136 (N.D.Ga. 1952).
28 The decisions are cited in the 1954 Ross Prize Essay, entitled, "The Investigating
Powers of Congress: Its Scope and Limitations." A.B.A. Jou. AL (September, 1954),
page 763, at page 811. See also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Washington
has an immunity statute, RCW 10.52.090.
24 State v. Britton, 27 Wn2d 336, 178 P.2d 341 (1947), State v. Jeane, 35 Wn2d 423,
213 P.2d 633 (1950?.
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attorney for the witness.25 Furthermore, the witness cannot claim it
on behalf of others. Thus, he may be compelled to relate crimes com-
mitted by others and may be compelled to identify the persons involved
so long as he himself is not involved.2"
The right to invoke the privilege may be waived either expressly or
impliedly.27 The privilege is deemed waived unless it is affirmatively
invoked as soon as it becomes reasonably apparent that the questions
may incriminate or have a tendency to incriminate that witness. 2
Answers which are privileged are not limited to answers which in
themselves amount to a confession of guilt. If the answers to the
questions would furnish a link in the proof of possible guilt, the witness
may invoke the privilege.2"
The privilege extends not only to oral testimony, but to the produc-
tion of incriminatory documents which would furnish a link in the
proof of crime.3" Thus, documents which have been acquired in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures, if used against the witness, would violate his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination."' Likewise, if the court rules32 or the
prosecutor argues,3" that an inference of guilt should be established
2r Haines v. United States, 188 F.2d 546 (9th Cir., 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 888
(1952). See also Perkins v. North End Bank of Seattle, 17 Wash. 100, 49 Pac. 241
(1897) (Duty of court to caution witness, and duty of counsel to suggest such caution
to court.) State v. Jeane, 35 Wn.2d 423, 433, 213 P.2d 633 (1950) (suggests that the
privilege may be waived in absence of objection to the incriminating question by de-
fendant or his counsel). A corporation is not entitled to the privilege, nor may an
agent of the corporation assert the privilege on his own behalf with respect to corporate
papers. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911), Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), United States v.
Cardiff, 95 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Wash., 1951). Cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1
(1948).
2 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141, 149 (1931). Whether the privilege is properly claimed is first determined by
the court. State v. James, 36 Wn.2d 882, 221 P.2d 482 (1952), Ex Parte Irvine, 74
Fed. 954 (S.D.O., 1896).
27 Rogers v. United States, note 26, supra., United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837
(2nd Cir., 1942), 147 A.L.R. 240.
28 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). Mere exposure to ridicule
or abuse is not enough. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
23 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 565 (1892), Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
20 Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928), Ex Parte Irvine, note 26, .supra.
21 Boyd v. United States, note 28, supra, Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 583 (1946).
32 City of Spokane v. Roberts, 132 Wash. 568, 232 Pac. 316 (1925), Seattle v.
Hawley, 13 Wn.2d 357, 124 P.2d 961 (1942), noted in 3 WAsH. L. REv. 161. State v.
Salle, 34 Wn.2d 183, 194, 208 P,2d. 872 (1949). State v. Raub, 103 Wash. 215, 173
Pac. 1094 (1918).
23 See Annotation, 116 A.L.R. 1170, State v. Pavelich, 150 Wash. 411, 273 Pac. 182
(1928). Cf. Sumpter v. National Grocery Co., 194 Wash. 598, 78 P.2d 1087, 116 A.L.R.
1166 (1938) and annotation following. State v. Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 P.2d 15
(1935). State v. O'Donnell, 191 Wash. 511, 71 P.2d 571 (1937). State v. Swan, 25
Wn.2d 319, 171 P.2d 222 (1946).
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by reason of the failure of the accused to deny evidence, such ruling
or argument would constitute a violation of the witness's privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. 4
On the question of whether the invocation of the privilege should
be ground for disbarment, a controlling consideration is whether the
invocation of the privilege necessarily means that the witness is guilty
of an offense inquired into. It has been suggested that a witness would
not invoke the privilege unless he were guilty of something-that that
is why he urges that the answer to a question propounded may in-
criminate him.3" However, an examination of the decisions and the
logic of the matter, discloses that the use of the privilege is not only
consistent with innocence in fact, but is consistent with innocence as a
matter of law.3" That is not to ay that the privilege may not be and
often is used as a shield to protect the guilty. The point is, that the
privilege was intended to be and may be used as a shield to. protect the
innocent. In a recent address by Justice Jesse W. Carter .of the
Supreme Court of California, published in "Vital Speeches," April 1,
1954, he pointed out (page 368) that a witness might claim the privi-
lege and be wholly innocent of any crime. He there stated:
"Let us again suppose that our witness claims the privilege con-
ferred by the fifth amendment, and let us assume that he is wholly
innocent of any crime. He may do so for several reasons: (1) He may
have done something, or said something, or joined some organization
which was, at the time it was done, said, or joined, devoid of any
criminal aspect and may be so even at the time of the investigation,
but his answers might be offered as evidence against him in a criminal
case; (2) he might be willing to answer questions about himself, but
unwilling to answer them about others, and thus afraid to answer the
personal questions because of the doctrine of waiver; (3) he might be
afraid that truthful answers might not check with answers given by
someone else and thus subject him to a prosecution for perjury; or
(4) he might simply and honestly disapprove of the entire investigation
and the methods by which such proceedings are conducted, feeling that
the questioning is not in accord with the principles of democracy laid
down by the framers of our great Constitution for this wonderful
3, See: Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the, Self Incrimination
Clause,'29 MicH. L. R Ev. 1, 191.
35 See Editorial, A.B.A. JoURNAL (December, 1953).
36 Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). "If it be objected that, [Burdicls]
refusal to answer was an implication of crime, we answer, 'Not necessarily in fact;
not at all in theory of law'." This is quoted in Dean Griswold's article, cited in foot-
note 37, infra.
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country known as America. These reasons show that an inference of
guilt is not the only inference to be drawn when the privilege is
claimed."
We are of the opinion that the above stated second and fourth
reasons for invoking the privilege are not proper grounds for so doing,
but the point is that if the privilege is invoked on such grounds in an
honest belief that the privilege is properly invoked, guilt would not
necessarily be inferred on account thereof.
Dean Irwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law School,37 as well as
others,3" have pointed out the consistency of the claim of innocence
with the invocation of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion.
It is because the invocation of the privilege is consistent with inno-
cence that it is believed that those courts that have heretofore passed
on the question in New York, Illinois and Mississippi89 properly and
correctly held that the mere invocation of the privilege should not be
ground for disbarment.
It should be remembered that there is adequate machinery presently
available under the law of Washington to discipline any lawyer who
aids in subversion. Recent federal legislation-namely, the Communist
Control Act of 19540 (as well as the Smith Act), ' coupled with the
recently-enacted Public Law 60042 to compel testimony under certain
conditions and to grant immunity from prosecution in connection
therewith, provide methods and means by which in connection with
the disbarment procedure provisions of the State Bar Act, courts are
enabled to protect the public against any possible unworthy members
of the bar. 3 Furthermore, the recent interest in providing for a code
of fair procedure by legislative investigating committees, as evidenced
by the recommendations of the American Bar Association,44 the enact-
3 7 Erwin N. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment and 'Per Legem Terrae,' Vol.
XXXIV, No. 1, MAss. LAW QUARERILY (April, 1954); A.B.A. JOURNAL (June, 1954),
page 502; "The Fifth Amendment as a Symbol," The Harvard Law School Record,
October 21, 1954.
38 E.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment, A.B.A. JOURNAL
(May, 1954), page 404.
39 See Note 16, supra.
40 Chapter 886, Public Law 637.
41 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385. See the Following Smith Act cases: Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951), reh. denied, 342 U.S. 842 (1952) ; Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
159 (1950) ; Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950).
42 The statute amends 18 U.S.C.A. 3486; 62 Stat. 833.
43 See RCW 2.48.220.
44 See Proceedings of House of Delegates, A.B.A. JOURNAL (October, 1954), pag6
900, et seq.
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ment of legislation by New York in 1954," and the efforts in Congress
to provide for such fair procedures, should serve to reduce to a mini-
mum whatever attempt there would be to otherwise invoke the Fifth
Amendment in hearings before Congressional committees." Fortu-
nately, the number of lawyers who have invoked the Fifth Amendment
has been very small.
Recently there has been considerable agitation concerning and
criticisms leveled against the invocation of the Fifth Amendment."
Such criticisms overlook the reason for the Fifth Amendment and the
history out of which it arose, 8 and further overlook the fact that a
witness may claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment without
necessarily being guilty of the crime involved or under investigation.
Thus fear of unjustified prosecution is itself under the authorities
sufficient to justify the invocation of the Fifth Amendment." What the
legal profession must make certain is that the profession will not by
its rules of discipline hamper lawyers in the fearless discharge of their
duties to advise their clients with that free independence of spirit that
is so essential to a vigorous and courageous defense of the liberties of
the citizen. The fact that a lawyer may hold unpopular opinions or
defend a client in an unpopular cause is not professional misconduct.
Indeed, the observance of the lawyer's oath is the citizen's protection
against illegal conduct."0 Recently the trustees of the Seattle Bar
Association adopted a resolution pointing up the lawyer's duty in cases
involving the defense of persons involved in unpopular causes. 1
4M McKinney's 1954 Session Laws of New York, Chapter 414.
46The privilege is also available under the State Constitution in hearings before a
state legislative committee. State v. James, 36 Wnf2d 882, 221 P.2d 482 (1950).47 E.g., see illustration of effect of criticism: Proposed "Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence," V (4), permitting an inference of guilt to be drawn from a refusal to testify.
Cf. The contrary common law rule, 58 Am. Jua. page 55, § 56. See also, "Invoking
the Fifth Amendment," Bulletin, of Atomic Scientists (June, 1953), pages 176, 181, 185.
48 See: Judge Julius J. Hoffman, Whom Are We Protecting? Some Thoughts on
the Fifth Amendment, A.B.A. JouRNAL. (July, 1954), page 582.
49 That was the reason relied on in the cases of In re Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d
963 (1940) and In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E2d 543, 545, 549 (1941). See also,
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
50 See: Editorial, A.B.A. JomxAL (October, 1953), Spirit of Boston, and Editorial,
A.B.A. JouRNAL (July, 1954), page 592.
51 The resolution adopted by the Board of Trustees of the Seattle Bar Association
reads as follows:
"BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Trustees of the Seattle Bar Association on
this l1th day of June, 1954:
That certain of the fundamental principles underlying the representation by lawyers
of unpopular persons and causes should be set forth at this time for the information and
assistance of the public and the bar and that, therefore, the following statement should
be issued and made public:
Throughout the course of history lawyers have been frequently called upon to
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It seems plain, however, that when an attorney of this State refuses
to answer a question properly put to him, upon the ground that the
answer would tend to incriminate him, that refusal should be properly
investigated by the State Bar Association. It certainly should not be
ignored.
Summarizing, therefore, the results of the foregoing discussion, it
is the opinion and recommendation of the Civil Rights Committee of
the Seattle Bar Association as follows:
1. That the Supreme Court of the State of Washington should not
adopt a rule making the mere invocation by an attorney of the Fifth
Amendment or Article I, Section 9 of the State Constitution, in itself
ground for disbarment because
First: The invocation of the privilege is not necessarily an admission
of the guilt of conduct which is ground for disbarment;
Second: Adequate disciplinary machinery is available for the im-
proper or unjustified use of the privilege by an attorney, including its
use for a purpose not waranted by the privilege, and its use to hide
personal guilt. In that connection, it is to be recalled that it has been
held that in a disbarment proceeding an attorney may not refused to
be a witness against himself by invoking a constitutional provision,
thereby preventing full and free investigation of his conduct as an
attorney for the purpose of determining his fitness to continue the
practice of law. Furthermore, should he decline to answer questions
represent and defend persons and causes known to be unpopular. This has been
particularly true in criminal matters, but it has been and is also true in other
fields, including investigations and hearings conducted by the legislative depart-
ment of the government.
The right of an accused person, or of a person called as a witness in a legislative
investigation, to have legal counsel carries with it the right of the lawyer to repre-
sent and defend him in accordance with the ethical standards of the bar.
Having undertaken any such representation, the lawyer has a duty to assert for
his client every remedy or defense authorized by the law of the land. The duty of
the lawyer is to be performed, however only within the bounds of the law and his
office does not permit, nor demand of him, for any client, any violation of the law
nor any manner of fraud nor improper conduct.
The public and the bar should recognize the duties and responsibilities of the
lawyer in such cases and should keep in mind that such representation, when per-
formed in accordance with ihe applicable ethical standards, is lawful and proper
and that it does not impute to the lawyer his client's views, character, deeds or
reputation."
The doctrine of guilt by association in the absence of participation in conspiracy is
repudiated in the Report of the Committee (dated June 1, 1954) to "The Board of
Governors of the State Bar of California," page 7, although the report favors the view
that the invocation of the Fifth Amendment by a lawyer is ground for disbarment.
Dean Griswold has emphasized the fact that the Fifth Amendment is regarded by many
as a symbol and testing ground of civil liberties.
See Note 37 supra.
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propounded on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate
him, adverse inferences may be drawn against him on that account.
It will be recalled that the resolution of the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association merely recommended inquiry into the
conduct of lawyers who invoked the Fifth Amendment, and did not
recommend that the mere invocation of the Fifth Amendment should
be ground for disbarment. The conclusions here reached are therefore
consistent with that resolution.
2. The Committee further recommends, however, that hereafter,
whenever a Washington attorney invokes the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, the local Administrative Committee of the
Bar with jurisdiction in the matter,52 in the exercise of the power to
investigate which that Committee now has, should cause an investiga-
tion to be made of his reason for invoking the privilege with a view to
determining after fair consideration whether the attorney involved is
in fact guilty of misconduct, either incident to or independently of the
invocation of the privilege, which is of such serious character as to
warrant disciplinary proceedings including possible disbarment."
Respectfully submitted,
CIVIi, RIGHTS COMMITTEE OF THE
SEATTLE BAR ASSOCIATION
By: EDWARD W. ALLEN GERALD D. H1LE
JoHN AMBLER GEORGE KINNEAR
PAUL P. ASHLEY KENNETH A. MACDONALD
WILLIAM D. AsxREN CLAY NIXoN
FiRsn W. CATLETT JOHN N. Rup
IRVING CLARK, JR. GEORGE R. STUNTZ
CLINTON H. HARTSON W. PAUL UHLMAN
EDWARD E. HENRY WILBUR ZUNDEL
CHARLES HOROWITZ
Chairman
52 Rules for Discipline of Attorneys, Rules 1 to 5 as amended.
53 See Note 38, footnote 10. For a discussion of the invocation of the privilege as
ground for the mandatory dismissal of public officials or public personnel, such as
teachers, see UxnvERsrry oF PExNSYLVAN A LAW RErIw, June, 1953, and May, 1954:
Vol. 101 U. of PA. L. R. 1190, 102 U. of PA. L. R. 871.
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